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RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
I. The trial court exceeded its discretion by granting the motion to strike the fact and 
expert witness lists that were belated due to counsel's inadvertence rather than 
fashioning a less Draconian remedy and dismissal of the well-developed and 
meritorious case. 
II. The trial court erred in granting the motion for summary judgment where in 
actuality there was a genuine issue of fact in contention as to whether plaintiffs 
injuries were caused by the vehicular collision and where defendant's expert 
witness and plaintiffs treating physician/expert Board Certified Impairment 
Rater both found that the injuries to plaintiffs neck, back and face were caused 
by the automobile collision. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS & CODIFICATIONS 
Utah Constitution Article VIII, Section 1 [Judicial powers ~ Courts.] 
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a Supreme Court, in a trial court of 
general jurisdiction known as the district court, and in such other courts as the Legislature by 
statute may establish. The Supreme Court, the district court, and such other courts designated by 
statute shall be courts of record. Courts not of record shall also be established by statute. 
Utah Constitution Article VIII, Section 5 Article VIII, Section 5. [Jurisdiction of district 
court and other courts — Right of appeal.] 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by this 
constitution or by statute, and power to issue all extraordinary writs. The district court shall 
have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other courts, both 
original and appellate, shall be provided by statute.... 
URCP 1(a) General provisions, Scope of Rules 
(a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern the procedure in the courts of the state of 
Utah in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil nature, whether cognizable at law or in 
equity, and in all special statutory proceedings, except as governed by other rules promulgated 
by this court or enacted by the Legislature and except as stated in Rule 81. They shall be 
liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. 
URCP 26(a)(3)(A). General provisions governing discovery. 
(a)(3)(A) A party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person who may be 
used at trial to present evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
URCP 37. Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanctions. 
(a)(2)(A) If a party fails to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a), any other party 
may move to compel disclosure and for appropriate sanctions. The motion must include a 
certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the party not 
making the disclosure in an effort to secure the disclosure without court action. 
URCP 37. Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanctions. 
(f) Failure to disclose. If a party fails to disclose a witness, document or other material as 
required by Rule 26(a) or Rule 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to discovery as required by 
Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall not be permitted to use the witness, document or other material at 
any hearing unless the failure to disclose is harmless or the party shows good cause for the 
failure to disclose. In addition to or in lieu of this sanction, the court on motion may take any 
action authorized by Subdivision (b)(2). 
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COUNTER-STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellee in his brief in this negligence case omits that at between 1:45 and 2:00 a.m. on 18 July 
2003, which appellee misstates was "a relatively short time after midnight" when the collision of 
the appellee's truck with the Infiniti in which the appellant was a passenger occurred, appellee 
was returning from playing in a rock band in Monk's bar in Salt Lake City. 
Appellee also omitted that although he swore at his deposition that he had nothing to drink that 
evening at the bar, his friend and res gestae witness to the collision, Justin Vigos, swore at his 
deposition that he observed appellee drinking in the bar. Later Vigos also was a passenger in 
appellee's truck at the time of the collision. Appellee also withholds in his statement of facts that 
a Jeep was stopped at the intersection south of the traffic control light facing north ahead of the 
Infiniti in which the appellant was a passenger and that the Jeep proceeded to make a left-hand 
turn in a westerly direction before appellee's truck entered the intersection at the maximum 
speed limit of 35 miles per hour. Appellee also fails to mention that he admitted at his 
deposition that rather than using his brake to avoid the collision with the Jeep, he blew his horn 
instead, proceeding at the same speed. The Infiniti in which the appellee was a passenger moved 
into the intersection on a green traffic control a arrow behind the Jeep to begin its left turn and 
appellee steered his truck behind the Jeep and ran into the front driver's side of the Infiniti. 
While appellee's states that appellant treated with a number of professionals over the years, 
seeking a cure to relieve the pain resulting from her face and arm striking and breaking the 
windshield from the impact of the collision, and injuries to her neck and back mentions prior 
benign injuries of the plaintiff that occurred prior to her 15th birthday and that were fully 
resolved before the collision that is the subject of the instant case, and appellee ignores the Utah 
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well-reasoned opinion in Biswell that holds the appellee is responsible for aggravating any pre-
existing condition of appellant. Appellee does correctly state the depositions of the four res 
jestae witnesses have been taken, thus memorializing their testimony for refreshment purposes 
prior to, or during, trial. 
Appellee neglects to disclose that the Index substantiates that the case was delayed and earlier 
case management orders and discovery dates had to be extended because two prior counsels for 
appellee withdrew from the case before appellee's third and present counsel entered his 
appearance, and after which the depositions of the four eyewitnesses were taken. Index pp 32-
33, 37-38 & 39-40. Also appellant's complaint pursuant to the four year statute of limitations for 
negligence cases did not need to be filed until 17 July 2007, notwithstanding that it was filed on 
or about 22 September 2005. Likewise appellee fails to mention that the case remained dormant 
for six months in 2008 until a dismissal order was set aside. 
While complaining in his statement of facts that appellant did not promptly approve of appellee's 
version of medical releases, appellee conceals that in April 2006 appellant provided appellee 
notarized authorizations for the release of medical records in blank so the appellee could use 
them to correctly obtain from appellant's treating physicians' and Dr. Keith Hansen medical 
records and reports about appellant. See Addendum. Appellee also fails to reveal that in his 16 
March 2007 designation of experts (Index pp 79-81) he did not disclose the name of a medical 
expert, and that when appellant's counsel communicated with appellee's counsel prior to the 
telephonic mediation with the district judge (Index pp 208-211) appellant's counsel suggested 
that appellee take the Comprehensive Consultation and Examination of 2 October 2003 of 
treating physician/expert Dr. Keith Hansen, DC, PC, Board Certified Impairment Rater (Index 
pp 337- 340), conducted close in time to the collision and provide this to a medical expert in 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
conjunction with a medical examination of appellant to substantiate that bona fide appellant's 
injuries were real and resulted from the collision, so as to potentially settle a case. Dr. Hansen's 
examination substantiated that appellant's head, neck and back injuries resulted from the 
vehicular collision as the mechanism of injury, which was consistent with the lengthy report 
generated by the expert witness finally hired by appellee, Dr. Chung, who completed his report 
on or about 1 March 2009, almost six years after the collision and about 3 Vi years after suit was 
filed. Index, pp 215 to 256. The case management order was amended on are about 24 March 
2009 specifically to allow appellee to secure a medical expert and to examine the appellant, since 
appellee previously had not retained such expert and had not deposed any of the treating 
physicians, or Dr. Hansen, although they were earlier identified to appellee's counsels. The 
district court judge was informed at the motion hearings of 11 January 2010 (Transcript, 9, 10 & 
12) that appellee's expert Dr. Chung conceded on page 41 of his report that the appellant was 
physically harmed including her neck, arm, back and leg by the collision. Appellee did not 
contradict his expert at the hearing regarding the collision being the cause of these injuries. 
On page eight of appellee's brief he fails to explain that the extension of the case management 
order in May 2009 was a function of appellant's concession to allow appellee additional time to 
obtain a medical expert and examine the appellant, which essential task appellee had failed to 
previously accomplish and appellee throughout failed to depose any of appellant's treating 
physicians, including Dr. Keith Hansen, appellant's treating physician/expert who was revealed 
to appellee much earlier in response to interrogatories and requests for production. 
Finally, appellee in his statement of facts does not disclose that the district judge was informed 
that the appellant was a Utah licensed Emergency Medical Technician, who was trained as a first 
responder to a traumatic accidents, including vehicular collisions requiring assessment of injuries 
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from the apparent mechanism of injury and extrication and stabilization, and who could certainly 
could testify that her own injuries and pain directly resulted from the collision in the instant case. 
Appellant's opinion that the injury to her head, neck, back and leg were directly caused by the 
vehicular collision, actually is substantiated by both Dr. Hansen's evaluation and Dr. Chung's 
report, hence in reality there is proof that appellant's injuries were proximately caused by the 
impact of appellee's truck with the front of the Infiniti in which the appellant was a passenger. 
Appellee's motion for summary judgment (Index pp 288-289) expressly indicates the issue 
presented was that appellant was unable to establish the cause of her injuries was the motor 
vehicle accident and the necessity of her subsequent medical expenses. 
II - THE DISTRICT COURTS GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS ACTUALLY 
FACTUALLY ERRONEOUS 
Appellant concurs with appellee's cite to McNair that holds the appellate courts extend no 
deference to the trial courts regarding the grant of motions for summary judgment and review the 
lower court's conclusions for correctness. Summary judgments in negligence cases are 
disfavored since such cases are extremely fact sensitive and the appellate courts are reticent to 
deprive plaintiffs of a due process trial where there are genuine issues of disputed fact. That 
appellate courts are reticent to deprive a meritorious plaintiff of the just determination of a cause 
of action for personal injury is consistent with the URCP 56 preference that genuine issues of 
disputed fact should be tried to the jury. 
APPLICABLE PRECEDENT 
The party moving for summary judgment must establish a right to judgment based on the 
applicable law regarding the undisputed material issues of fact. URCP 56. Transamerica Cash 
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Reserve, Inc. v Dixie Power & Water, Inc., 789 P2d 24, 25 (Ut 1990), Celotex Corp v Catrett, 
Ml U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). 
Summary judgment is only appropriate " if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. URCP 
56(c). In making its determination the court must considered that not only the affidavits but the 
pleadings, admissions, and depositions. Lundberg v Backman, 337 P2d 433 (Ut 1959). 
Oberhansky v Sprouse, 751 P2d 1155, 1156 (Ut App 1988) holds under UCP 56(c), summary 
judgment shall be rendered only "... if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
Pleadings must be reviewed for purposes of a URCP 56 motion for summary judgment. Dupler 
v Yates, 351 P2d 624, 637 (Ut 1960), Langley v Hayward, 656 P2d 1020, 1022 (Ut 1982), Riser 
vAJ. Bayless Markets, Inc., 449 P2d 637, 640-41 (Ut 1969). 
Plainly the court must read the content of the complaint, hear the proffers of counsel, and the 
consider the current affidavit, moreover even the inferences in affidavits and those allegations in 
the plaintiffs' complaint must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, to 
determine if the undisputed facts before the court establish whether a summary judgment is 
proper as a matter of law. Atlas Corp v Clovis Natl. Bank, 131 P2d 225, 229 (Ut 1987). When 
evaluating a motion for summary judgment, a court must consider all of the facts and evidence 
proffered, and every reasonable inference arising therefrom, in a light most favorable to the 
party opposing the motion. Ratzenberger v State, 735 P2d 405, 408 (Ut App 1987). 
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DISCUSSION 
Failure on the part of the moving party to meet this initial burden may render summary judgment 
inappropriate and the appellee failed to file a verified affidavit rebutting the averments in 
plaintiffs affidavit that establish that in fact her injuries were proximately caused by the 
collision and that she sought medical assistance from a variety of reputable health care providers 
in California and Utah to remediate the effects of her injuries. 
In fact during a hearing in the lower court it was made clear to the district judge that the 
evaluations of both appellant's treating physician and Board Certified Impairment Rater and 
defendant's medical expert both concurred that the injuries to appellant's head, neck, back and 
leg, as referenced in her medical records, were caused by the collision and appellant's unrebutted 
affidavit as an EMT concurred with these opinions. 
The injuries in reality having been established as proximately caused by the collision, the issue 
on the motion for summary judgment should have been decided in favor of the appellant, 
however notwithstanding the truth, as established by the opinions of the two expert, the district 
court fixed the result against appellant contrary to the truth by precluding the opinion of the only 
expert specifically cited in both appellant's formal designation and by appellee in his designation 
of witnesses, Dr. Hansen, granted summary judgment, notwithstanding that even upon rejection 
of appellant's designation appellant could have called as a witness appellee's proffered expert, 
Dr. Michael Chung, to establish his stated medical opinion that appellant's injuries were caused 
by the collision, you or allowed the appellant as an EMT to establish the obvious, that the 
mechanism of her immediate injuries and a need for subsequent medical care to attempt to 
alleviate the immediately resulting pain was the collision. 
The district court ignored the truth that was put before it and created a summary judgment on 
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stringent technical procedural grounds, notwithstanding the actual facts, to deprive the appellant 
of a due process trial of her meritorious claim and of compensation for those proximately caused 
injuries. 
I THE LOWER COURT EXCEEDED ITS DISCRETION IN STRIKING 
DEFENDANT'S WITNESS DESIGNATIONS WHEN THERE WERE OTHER LESS 
DESTRUCTIVE PROCEDURAL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO ENFORCE THE 
COURT'S SCHEDULING ORDER, TO AMELIORATE ANY PURPORTED 
PREJUDICE TO APPELLEE, AND TO ALLOW THE APPELLANT THE RIGHT TO 
TRIAL GUARANTEED BY THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
During the hearing of the motions in the lower court appellee's counsel proceeded to interrupt 
appellant's counsel, to state appellant's reason for failing to more promptly file and serve his 
witness lists, and correctly explained to the court that the reason appellant failed to timely 
designate witnesses in the out-of-time lists belatedly filed and served was counsel had his 
appointments and deadlines recorded into his office computer network in a Microsoft Outlook 
program as reminders, but the due dates for the witness lists in the order inadvertently were not 
registered and unlike other obligations entered in the program and accomplished each month the 
witness lists obligation was inadvertently neglected and was not logged into the Outlook 
scheduling program. Appellant's counsel overlooked his obligation to assure that his office help 
had logged this responsibility into the monthly calendar. Hearing Transcript, 11 January 2010, 
pp 18-19 & 17 -11 6 - 13. 
APPLICABLE PRECEDENT 
The Judicial Department of the Utah government was created by the people in Article VIII, 
Section 1 of the Utah Constitution and the district court is empowered by Article VIII, Section 
5 " . . . except as limited by this constitution or by statute,. . ." Although the district court has 
broad discretion in applying the provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, nonetheless that 
authority is circumscribed by the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11 that plainly 
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proclaims the preference as a general rule that no person be denied the right to prosecute any 
civil cause before any tribunal in this State and that every person shall have remedy by due 
course of law for an injury done to him in his person. 
Consistent with aforementioned and express constitutional preference that no injured person 
should be denied the right to prosecute any civil cause for compensation, the Utah Supreme 
Court mandated in URCP 1(a) General provisions, Scope of Rules that the URCP governing 
procedure in the courts of the State of Utah in all civil actions shall be liberally construed 
principally to secure the just determination of every action to avoid the consequence of error and 
the secondary and tertiary considerations should be for a speedy and inexpensive the 
determination. 
Since the URCP parallels the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah appellate courts have 
considered the holdings of Federal Appellate courts as persuasive authority in applying 
procedural sanctions, notwithstanding that a Utah Constitutional and URCP 1(a) additionally 
establish a presumption in favor of the mandatory right of every person to prosecute any civil 
cause before any tribunal for a remedy regarding a personal injury and have justice done that 
circumscribes the authority of the courts to consider tactfully the potential dismissal of claims for 
perceived to procedural violations. Dugan v Jones, 615 P2d 1239,1244 (Ut 1980). 
In Dugan the trial court was reversed for abuse of discretion in refusing to allow a plaintiff to 
have his expert witnesses testify, effectively precluding him from proving the case for failure to 
conform to a pretrial order of eleven months earlier requiring the parties to exchange witness 
lists 15 days before trial. The court held pre-trial orders are not hoops of steel and that they 
always may be modified in the interest of the administration of justice and the lower court should 
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consider the possible severity of the prejudice on the plaintiff. The appellate court further held 
that inconvenience to the lower court by allowing the opposing party additional time to obtain 
their own expert witnesses does not outweigh the prejudice resulting from the exclusion of 
experts where the court could have used other means to sanction the party to gain compliance. 
The Dugan court cited with a approval Metheny v Porter, 158 F2d 478, 480-81 (CA 10 1946), 
which held that the trial court should have used means other than exclusion to sanction a party 
for noncompliance with a pretrial order rather than exclusion of expert witnesses. While the 
Utah rule may be more narrowly circumscribed due to the express terms of the Utah Constitution 
and application of URCP 1(a), unlike the instant case the non-conforming party in Dugan had 
not previously alerted the opposition to the identity of the expert during discovery, provided 
relevant records, or provided a material evaluation of the appellant by the expert to his adversary, 
unlike appellee in the instant case. Hence a less Draconian sanction than exclusion of the expert 
to assure compliance with the pretrial order was appropriate where such a severe sanction would 
determine the outcome of the case in favor of the defendant without a trial, notwithstanding 
truthfully both the appellant and appellee's experts opined that appellant's injuries were caused 
by the collision in which both parties were involved. 
An instant case the appellant's counsel did not comply with a portion of the pretrial order due to 
mere inadvertence, and there was no deliberate or intentional disobedience, contemptuous affront 
to the court, willful or bad faith conduct, continuing clear history of delay, and a lesser sanction 
would have been appropriate to achieve compliance without prejudice to the appellant by a 
procedural dismissal of the personal injury cause of action and appellee likewise could have 
been protected from any asserted unfair prejudice by allowing appellee to depose Dr. Hansen at 
appellant's expense. While appellee throughout the case was likewise responsible for delay in 
// Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
progress of the case he should not be heard to demand to win outright without a trial on a 
procedural technicality rather than on the substantive merit of the case. 
Berrett v Denver Rio Grande, 830 P2d 291, 293 (UtApp 1992) holds that while district courts 
have broad discretion to manage their cases "(exclusion is a severe sanction which should be 
invoked only to enforce willful noncompliance)" with a case management order, since such 
sanction is extreme and should be employed only with caution and restraint. Berrett, supra, 
p 293 teaches that the appellate court will reverse the trial court for exclusion of a expert witness 
if the error is prejudicial to the substantial rights of a party. Exclusion of a witness is prejudicial 
to the substantial rights of a party where it is outcome determinative of the case, since the matter 
should be resolved in favor of allowing the litigant to have a full and fair presentation of his 
cause to the jury where both experts agree that the collision caused most of appellant's injuries. 
Dismissal of a cause of action was an appropriate sanction in a case where plaintiffs attorney 
failed to attend four pre-trial conferences, failed to attend three scheduling conferences, plaintiff 
failed to attend her deposition four times, where there was a general history of delay and 
disobedience to the court's orders, and where counsel failed to appear at the fourth and final pre-
trial wasting the court's time and no other sanction would serve the best interests of justice. 
Yannitelli v Navieras, 106 FRD 42 (SDNY 1985). 
Instantly appellant's counsel's inadvertence solely regarding witness designations certainly was 
not close to the egregious level of the plaintiff in Yannitelli, and the district court judge in the 
instant case could have merely ordered that plaintiff to make the expert witness/treating 
physician available for deposition by appellee to alleviate any purported prejudice to the 
appellee, even though appellant previously alerted appellee regarding Dr. Hansen in response to 
interrogatories, provided the expert's medical records to appellee and his expert, and provided 
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Dr. Hansen's comprehensive evaluation for appellee's expert to review and assess - obviating 
any thinly asserted surprise or unfair prejudice. 
In John v Louisiana, 828 F2d 29 (CA5 1987) a dismissal was reversed as unjustified 
notwithstanding that the plaintiffs attorney foiled to comply with the scheduling order by 
dilatory responses to discovery requests, late submission of a pretrial order, failure to make 
timely filings during the two weeks prior to the trial date, exhibiting carelessness and 
inconsiderate and understandably exasperating conduct to a conscientious judge. The appellate 
court held that the attorney's conduct more closely approximated negligence that does not 
warrant dismissal than the stubborn resistance to authority that does since greater delay, bad faith 
or persistent disobedience to court orders was required and in this case counsel was not 
purposely obstructive and the delay was unintentional so the ultimate penalty of dismissal should 
not have been imposed since there was no clear record of delay or insubordinate resistance. 
Moreover the court, noting that the plaintiff was innocent of any deliberate misconduct, was 
reluctant to dismiss the case and damage the plaintiffs cause of action where a lesser sanction 
would serve the best interests of justice. 
Plaintiffs counsel's mere inadvertence in the instant case was far below the level of culpability 
in John, especially where the preference expressed in the Utah Constitution is for a worthy 
plaintiff not be denied the right to prosecute a civil cause and to have a remedy for an injury 
personally done to him or her. In accord with John the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Woodmore v Git-N-Go, 790 F2d 1947 (1986) reversed a dismissal by the trial court as an 
extreme sanction where the attorney failed to file a pre-trial memorandum by the trial court's 
deadline, and counsel also previously was warned that failure would be sufficient grounds for a 
summary dismissal. The lower court was cautioned to set forth why such an extreme sanction 
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was imposed as the most appropriate and why other orders were not considered to gain 
compliance where counsel, not the plaintiff, appeared" to be responsible for the default. 
In Crossman v Raytheon, 316 F3d 36, 39-40 (CA1 2002) the court, noting that prior to choosing 
a harsh sanction of dismissal that district court should have indicated consideration of the 
alternatives in the broad panoply of lesser sanctions available, reversed the dismissal as an abuse 
of discretion. The lower court's power to discipline was found not to be without limit or 
unfettered where counsel failed to file a joint statement or attend the scheduling conference. 
Crossman, supra, p 38. It was found that such inadvertence did not rise to the level of prejudice 
justifying dismissal and the district court should have considered other alternatives. The 
transcript of the hearing below, as abovementioned, indicates this predicament was also one in 
which appellant's counsel found himself through no fault of appellant. The district court was 
admonished to consider the nature and number of violations and to consider lesser alternative 
sanctions, especially where the conduct was not particularly egregious, extreme, or contumacious 
and the lower court exceeded its discretion in striking defendant's designations and skewing the 
outcome of the case in defendant's favor where the failures to comply were few and clearly 
inadvertent and where the sanction was the maximum extreme. 
The sanction of dismissal is the most severe sanction that a court may apply and hence, if it all, 
it should be without prejudice. Durgin v Graham, 372 F2d 130, cert denied 388 US 919. 
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CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT 
The seminal issue on appeal really is whether a meritorious claim for an actual injury will be 
permitted to go to trial for compensation or whether compensation will be foreclosed due to 
procedural inadvertence. 
The length of time the case was pending was not to unfairly prejudicial as the insurance company 
for the appellee maintained the policy limit funds and enjoyed the interest accrued, where the 
appellee was equally responsible for some of the delay throughout the years by rotation of 
attorneys, and where appellee disregarded obtaining a medical expert until years after the case 
was filed, and where due to the nature of the appellant's injuries the passage of time was a better 
indicator as to whether some of the damage done to appellant's person would remain chronic 
rather than relying on the opinion of an expert like appellee's Dr. Chung to speculate about how 
far into the future the appellant's injuries would diminish her enjoyment of life due to the pain 
appellant would experience when attempting to participate in the extremely active lifestyle that 
she enjoyed prior to the collision. 
Nor is there any actual unfairly prejudicial loss of the accurate recollection of the four res gestae 
eyewitnesses to the collision whose depositions were taken to memorialize their testimony and 
record it in transcripts that each could use to accurately refresh their memories. Similarly 
appellant's medical records could be used by the treating physicians for refreshment, since those 
records were sufficient for review by appellant's expert, Dr. Chung, about six years after the 
accident to wade in on his opinion regarding appellant's injuries although he never treated the 
appellant nor physically examined her for more than about 15 minutes years later. 
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The unfair prejudice weakly asserted by appellee is further dispelled where the appellee's 
designation of factual witnesses generally reflects those in the appellant's designation and where 
the appellant's designation of Dr. Hansen, not only as a treating physician but also as an expert 
in vehicular causation of physical injuries to humans does not unfairly prejudiced the appellee 
who was made aware of Hansen years ago in interrogatories, whose records and evaluation 
appellee's were provided and who appellee nonetheless lethargically decided not to depose. 
According to precedent the lower court abused its discretion since a number of alleged 
procedural violations are few over that period of time the case has been pending and the motive 
resulting in the mere inadvertence in filing the witness lists certainly was not malevolent or 
intentional. Nonetheless the sanctions were the most extreme possible and were in conflict with 
the intention of the framers of the Utah Constitution and of URCP 1(a) that the truth will out, 
justice be done and a full and fair hearing of the civil cause be extended to the injured appellant. 
These limitations circumscribe the broad discretion of the district court's alternatives for 
enforcing the terms of the last scheduling order that was stipulated to by counsel and in imposing 
a fair remedy for plaintiffs counsel's inadvertence and in belatedly complying with the 
provisions that scheduling order, rather than buttressing the Draconian decision to dismiss the 
case for the presumed inability of the appellant to prove the collision of the automobile and the 
truck that appellee was driving was the proximate cause of the injury to her face, neck, back and 
arm. See rebuttal Affidavit of Plaintiff, prg # 2, Document Entry, pg 367 & Complaint, prgs 22 
& 23, Document Entry, pg 5. 
Defendant filed no affidavit supporting his motion for summary judgment, nor rebutting the 
averments in the Affidavit of Plaintiff. Securing justice is dependent upon the ascertainment of 
the truth and an outcome determined thereupon. 
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While appellee has cited the court to URCP 26(a)(3)(A) and 37(a)(2)(a) & (f) appellee 
disingenuously ignores and withholds that the idenity of Dr. Keith Hansen and other fact 
witnesses were disclosed to appellee in responses to appellee's interrogatories early on in the 
case and appellee was provided the results of Dr. Hansen's October 2003 Examination Report of 
the appellant well prior to an appellee finally retaining his own expert, Dr. Michael Chung, who 
addressed Dr. Hansen's Examination Report within the context of his 1 March 2009 Report -
Index pp 337-340 and 215-256. Appellee ignores that he never included the required 
certification that he conferred in good faith with appellant's counsel to secure disclosure without 
court action of documents and information regarding the witnesses disclosed to appellee in 
answers to interrogatories and requests for production propounded by appellee, but instead 
contrary to URCP 37(a)(2)(a) appellee raced to the courthouse with his motion for summary 
judgment and to strike seeking to win the case by a tactical use of the procedural rules. 
25 February 2011 ^ V / / , M ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
FRANKLIN RICHARD BRUSSOW, 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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AUTHORIZATION FOR MEDICAL CLAIM RECORDS AND REPOi 
In compliance with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPA A) of 1996 and 45 CFR 164.508 
I, Heather Brussow, hereby authorize "the above-named entity to disclose and deliver to Stegall & Associates, 
6056 South Fashion Square Drive, Suite 200, Murray, Utah 84107. or a representative of its office, all 
documents relating to my physical and mental conditions, and medical claim records consisting billings for 
raw test data, copies of x-rays, transcripts, hospital case histories, reports, lab tests and reports, and any 
documentation concerning the payment or processing of claims for payment pertinent to the preceding 
services from January 1994 through the present. 1 understand that this consent also includes billings for 
alcohol and drug abuse records that are protected by federal law under 42 C.F.R. Stagall & Associates and its 
representatives will use this information pursuant to 11R C P Rtile 26.1 or Federal Rule 26 to verify and 
evaluate my claim. 
1 hereby release the above-named entity from liability on all claims of any nature whatsoever pertaining to 
the disclosure of information contacted in the written material specified above. 1 understand that if the person 
or entity that receives the information is not a health care provider or health plan covered by the federal 
privacy regulations, the information described above although no longer protected by these regulations is still 
confidential and will remain so.. 
A COPY OF THIS AUTHORIZATION IS AS VALID AS THE ORIGINAL, AND THE DURATION 
SHALL BE ONE YEAR FROM THE DATE OF SIGNATURE. REQUESTING PARTY TO PAY ALL 
COSTS OF REPRODUCTION AND PROVISION AND THE PROTECTED PARTY MAY SEEK FROM 
THE PROVIDER A FULL SET OF THE DOCUMENTS REPRODUCED. 
I have read the above and foregoing Authorization for Medical Records and Reports and do hereby 
acknowledge that I am familiar with and fully understand the terms and conditions of this Authorization. I 
also understand that I can revoke this authorization at any time by notifying the provider or Stegall & 
Associates in writing or otherwise. I understand that any actions already taken, in reliance on, this 
authorization will not be reversed and any revocation will not affect those actions. 
i)" III IMliisSOia, I ,P\(r^. V\ ,2006 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
}SS. 
I'OHNI \ OFSAI I LAKE) 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this60dayof i'ili ffiJO / '(>0<>. In lk-dtli.ei Brussow. 
^""JSw^"" ""*""* Notary"Public * / / ' / /""•)/-"> 
I / * S S k KATHIWMES.W. BLACK I , ^ / / / ] / i y h / 
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